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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ELECTORS OF THE PROPOSED
BODY CORPORATE, OF THE TOWN
OF COTTONWOOD CITY,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY and WILLIAM
E. DUNN, PHILLIP R. BWMQUIST, and
RALPH Y. McCLURE, CONSTITIJTING
THE MEMBERS OF SAID COMMISSION,
Respondents,
and
WALKER E. ANDERSON FOR HIMSELF
AND ALL PERSONS SIMILARLY SITIJATED AND THOSE OPPOSED TO THE
PETITION, MANDAMUS, WRIT, AND
TOWN INCORPORATION,
lntervenors and Respondents.

\

Case No.
12748

Brief of Intervenors and Respondents

NATIJRE OF CASE
This is Appellants action in mandamus to compel
the Salt Lake County Commissioners to approve Appellant's petition for incorporation, under the Utah Code,
Section 10-2-6.
I

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellants filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus
(R 54) and the Court issued its Alternative Writ of Mandamus (R 1). Intervenors intervened (R 15), by Court
Order. The matter was argued to the Court without any
testimony being taken. The Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and Alternative Writ of Mandamus was denied and
said action dismissed with prejudice (R 9).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Intervenors and Respondents, respectfully request
this Court to sustain the Lower Court's Decision, dated
November 29, 1971 (R 16) and affirm the Lower Court
Decree, dated December 10, 1971, (R 9).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants, 17 registered voters, (R 33) filed and
petitioned the Salt Lake County Commissioners (R 34, 35,
36) for the incorporation of the Town of Cottonwood
City, being mainly the Cottonwood Mall and a few sur·
rounding streets. The Petition and Opposition, (R 50,
51, 52, 53) were publicly heard by the Commissioners.
About October 4, 1971, the Commissioners in their dis·
cretion denied the Petition for incorporation, Utah Code
Sec. 10-2-6. Their AFFIDAVIT regarding their reasons
for denial is on file, (R 32).

2

ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE INCORPORATION OF A TOWN,
UNDER SECTION 10-2-6, IS A DISCRETIONARY MATTER WITH THE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS AND NOT BY MANDAMUS.
The Writ of Mandamus will issue only where there
is a showing of abuse of discretion and that the abuse of
discretion must appear very clearly before the Court will
interfere by Mandamus, 52 Am. Jur. 2d, Section 79, State
v. Bunge, 73 P2d 516. Also from 52 Am. Jur. 2d the following is cited: the Writ of Mandamus will not issue to
compel the performance of discretionary acts, Section 76,
Haslam v. Morrison, 113 U.14, 190 P2d 520; and that discretion means the power or right conferred upon Respondents by law of acting officially under certain circumstances
according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience, and not controlled by the judgment or conscience
of others, and even when an act is ministerial in character,
it has been said that if the proper performance thereof
involves discretion, the Writ will not direct a decision in
a particular way, Section 76; and the use of the Writ will
not ordinarily be extended so as to interfere with the manner in which the discretion is exercised or to influence or
coerce a particular determination, Section 78; and Mandamus is not an instrument for the instruction of public
officers as to the manner in which they shall discharge
duties which call for the exercise of discretion, as distinguished from the performance of ministerial duties,
Section 78; and where, as to the facts, there exists any ad-
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missible doubt, or where reasonable men might conscien.
tiously differ with respect to discretion or the absence there.
of, the Courts have with practical unanimity declined to
interfere by mandamus, and whenever an element of dis.
cretion enters into the duty to be performed, the functions
of mandatory authority are short of their customary po.
tency and become powerless to dictate terms to that dis·
cretion. The Court is without power to substitute its dis·
cretion for that of Respondents, or where the act is dis·
cretionary, to direct that it be performed in a specified
manner, Section 78. Mandamus will not issue to compel
the revision or modification of a decision of the Respond·
ents in the exercise of their deliberative and discretionary
powers. Goodman v. Meade, 162 Pa. Super 587, 60 A2d
5 77. It has been reiterated that in the absence of a capri·
cious or arbitrary act, Mandamus will not issue to control
the exercise of official discretion or to alter or review acts
taken in the proper exercise of such discretion of Respond·
ents, Smith v. Butters, 38 U. 151, 112 P. 809. Mandamus
will not lie and is never issued in doubtful cases and no
abuse of discretion by Respondents has been shown by
Petitioners, Rule 65 B(b) (2).
The Legislature intended that the Respondents use
their discretion as Section 10-2-6 provides "on approval of
such petition by said board."
The 1884 Laws of Utah provide among other things
"which being approved by said Comt", as in 1884 Utah
was under the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts.
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The 1898 Revised Statutes of Utah, Section 299 provides, among other things, "a majority of the electors of
any town" . . . . "and to be approved by said board".
The opponents to the Petition and all others in Salt
Lake County similarly situated would be denied their right
to be heard, and due process of law, if the Court should
enforce such Writ, as the Utah Constitution provides in
Article 1, Section 7 that "no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law," also
the United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section
l, provides, among other things, that the state shall not
deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law.
Section 10-2-6 provides, among other things, "\Vhenever a majority of the electors". Until a person qualified
to exercise the privilege of voting actually takes advantage
of his franchise, he does not become an elector as that
term is used in the Wyoming Constitution and laws,
School District v. Cook, 424 P2d 751. A person may be
a taxpayer and yet not be an elector, Harrison v. Board of
Commissioners, 68 Idaho 463, 198 P2d 1013. The ordinary meaning of elector does not include taxpaying as one
of its elements, Maguez v. School District, 128 P2d 480,
109 Colo. 5 51. The word elector in a Statute in relation
to bond issuance, providing that they shall not be issued
unless authorized by a majority of electors, means voters
who have registered so as to be entitled to vote at any
election held under the Constitution or laws of the State,
Green v. Village of Riezi, 40 So. 17. Elector used throughout the constitutional and statutory provisions governing
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initiative petitions require all persons signing the initiative
petition to comply with regulation laws before doing so,
Ahrens v. Kirby, 37 P2d 375, 44 Ariz. 269.
The incorporation of a municipality is purely a legis.
lative function and the power to create municipalities
cannot be delegated to the judicial branch of government,
57 N.W.2d 66. An Act which permits a few petitioners to
fix the boundaries of a new municipal corporation and to
determine the electorate to pass upon its creation is in·
valid as a delegation to provide individuals of legislative
function, Row v. Ray, 231 NW 689.
The overriding and paramount reasons for the Pe·
titian for incorporation of the Town is so that the owners
of the power plant at the Cottonwood Mall can sell the
power plant to the Town to sell electricity. The power
plant is not in operation at this time, see U.S. District
Court Decree, Civil No. C-229-68, Cottonwood Mall v.
Utah Power & Light Company which was affirmed by the
U.S. Court of Appeals 10th Circuit, 440 F.2d 36. The
United States Supreme Court denied Cottonwood Mall's
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, U.S. Sup. Ct. No. 71-179,
Vol. 30 L.Ed2d, No. 1, p. 99, Nov. 15, 1971. A copy of
the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is on file with the Clerk
of the Utah Supreme Court.
During the Utah Legislative General Session of 1971
there was an attempt by S. B. No. 128 to amend the Elec·
trical Corporations Section 54-2-1 of the Utah Code, how·
ever, the attempt was unsuccessful.
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The Tenth Circuit, in Cottonwood Mall, supra, stated
among other things,

* * * * "The basic question is put in issue by the
defense that Cottonwood lacks the necessary Certificate of Public Convenience from the Utah Public Service Commission and therefore cannot challenge these economic activities of Power Company.
The Court below gave Summary Judgment to
Power Company on the ground that Cottonwood
would need a Certificate before it could press its
claims, for if it had no right to sell electricity, then
by definition Power Company could not interfere
with this "right".
Mr. Sidney M. Horman has veto power at and over
the Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center and he would
probably have veto power over any Town Council and
Mayor of Cottonwood City as Mr. Horman's Group apparently owns the Cottonwood Mall and controls most
of the property on the Streets within the proposed Town.

In the Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the U.S.
Sup. Ct. by Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center, Inc., supra,
there is stated on page 8,
* * * * "The board of directors of this association consists of persons elected by the merchants
and of Mr. Sidney M. Horman, president of petitioner corporation. All of the activities held at the
mall must have the approval of the board of directors of the association and of Mr. Horman"****·
The foregoing matters were cited and argued to the
County Commissioners and Lower Court.
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To allow the incorporation of this Town, which is
mainly for the purpose of buying the power plant from
the owners at the Cottonwood Mall would open the door
to indiscriminate cropping up of Towns all over Salt Lake
County and this would almost destroy county government.
The constitutional rights of the people of Salt Lake
County are paramount and greater than the rights of the
few Petitioners who purport and desire to incorporate a
Town so as to accommodate the owners of the power plant
at Cottonwood Mall, by the Town purchasing the power
plant. The rights of all people to be protected from this
Town incorporation intrusion, are greater than the privilege conferred by Statute for incorporation.
There was and is no showing by appellants that they
have made provisions for fire protection, sewage, water,
lights, police protection, upkeep of public roads, and there
is no assurance by them that any agency, party or person
will furnish necessities.
The arbitrarily drawn boundaries, by the Petitioners
for the Town, show that there is no liquor stores within
the boundaries, no churches in the boundaries, no schools
in the boundaries, no fire department within the boundaries, no boarding houses within the boundaries, no night
clubs in the boundaries, no motels or hotels within the
boundaries and no taxi service within the boundaries. This
was shown to and known by the Commissioners and
Lower Court.
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Respondents did not approve the Petition for the
Town, among other things, because there was no showing
that Petitioners were a majority of the electors and they
did not demonstrate that they were qualified electors.
The Master Plan of Salt Lake County Planning &
Zoning in the area would be disrupted as there are numerous planning and zoning problems presently in the area
such as traffic and its attendant hazards. Towns cannot be
incorporated whimsically as these few Petitioners seem to
thrust themselves, for a Town, on the rest of the County.
Respondents heard annexation as a problem if the
Town is incorporated.
There is no showing that there is proper flood control
for the Town, upkeep and expenses for water channels
and boundary, public aid for welfare cases, jail house,
public buildings and upkeep and hospital facilities. In
fact the County jail is approximately 10 miles away from
the proposed Town.
POINT

II

THE LEGISLATURE MAY DELEGATE TO
THE C 0 UN TY COMMISSIONERS FOR
COUNTY PURPOSES, LEGISLATIVE POWER.

Taylor v. Robertson (1898), 16 U.330; 52 P.1 was an
Assessment case. "The discretion must be exercised in a
reasonable manner, and not maliciously, wanton and arbitrarily to the wrong and injury of another. This is held
to be the rule applicable to public officers who are bound
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to exercise their deliberate judgment in the discharge of
their official duties, and is applicable to all inferior magistrates and others called to the performance of functions
in their nature and character quasi judicial, while acting
within their jurisdiction and the legal scope of their powers as fixed by law". An ordinance may, like a statute, "af.
feet property rights and individual liberty; and the framers of the constitution evidently intended, by the use of the
word "statutes" to include "ordinances" and that the appellate Court should have power to determine the validity
of any law, whether of local or general application, and
whether enacted directly by the law-making power or by
a municipality through a delegation of power by the legislature, City of Eureka v. Wilson, 48 P.41, and while the
lawmaking power of the state is vested in the legislature,
yet it is competent for the legislature to delegate power to
municipal corporations to pass ordinances which shall
have the same force, within the municipality, as a statute,
to control its municipal affairs.
The legislature, by Section 10-2-6, delegated to the
County Commissioners the authority to decide in their
sound discretion (R 32) when a "Town" could be incor·
porated, as said Section is not self executing as Petitioners
argue. "On approval of such petition by said board" vests
discretion (R 32) in the County Commissioners.
"The law will not allow a revocation or alteration of
a statute by construction when the words may have their
proper construction without it", Lewis' Sutherland Statu·
tory Construction, Vol. 2, p. 732.
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Section 10-2-6 provides, among other things, whenever a majority of the electors of any "unincorporated
town"; therefore,
"The term "unincorporated town" was one
created by legislative enactment. It was a term intended to apply to the establishment of town government for certain communities which, acting
under the provisions of the Statute of 1879, petitioned the board of County Commissioners that the
Act might become operative. In our judgment it is
clear that the term "unincorporated towns", as
used in the provisions to subdivision 9 of Section
1, referred specifically to those towns which had
assumed a form of town government under the Act
of 1879 entitled, "An Act to provide for the government of unincorporated towns in this state",
(Nevada 1916) Board of Commissioners v. Schmidt
157 P.1073. That 1879 Act was repealed by the
Nevada Legislature in 1881."
We see from 14 Am Jur, Counties, Section 33, the
rule is laid down regarding the separation of powers that
Courts, "is such that they cannot perform executive duties
or interfere with the performance of legislative duties.
They are not endowed with visitorial powers to approve or
disapprove the manner in which County Commissioners
exercise the powers conferred upon them," * * * "So long
as the Commissioners act honestly and in good faith",
* * * and the "Courts have no authority to interfere with
or control their legitimate discretion", (R 32).
In Murphy v. Grand County, 268 P2d 677, 1U2d412,
the Commissioners in their broad discretion could fix the
salary of the County Attorney at $10.00 per year.
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Neither the judiciary nor the executive can create or
destroy a municipality which is but a subdivision of the
state government, Hornsbrook v. Elk Grove, 21 SE 851.
In Am Jur 2d Vol. 56, Municipal Corporations, we
report the following: The governmental functions of the
County Commissioners are those conferred upon them as
a local agency, to be exercised not only in the interest of
the people, but also in the advancement of the public good
or welfare as affecting the fmblic generally, and this includes the promotion of public peace, health, safety and
morals, as well as the expenditure of money, Section 199,
and the power to create or establish municipal corporations is a political function which rests solely in the legis·
lative branch of the government, Section 28; as in Section 10-2-6, the legislature provided for the County Commissioners to exercise their discretion and it is a political
function for them to create or deny (R 32) the incorporation of the Town of Cottonwood City. Section 10-2-6 is
not self executing and the County Commissioners are with·
in their discretionary powers in properly denying the incorporation of the Town of Cottonwood City. So far as the
functions of the County Commission are legislative, they
rest in the sound discretion and judgment of the
Commissioners, Section 196, Am. Jr. 2d Vol. 56; also
where power over a particular subject matter has been
delegated to a municipal corporation by the legislature
without any express limitations, the extent to which that
power shall be exercised rests in the discretion of the munic-

ipal authorities, and as long as it is exercised in
good faith and for a municipal purpose, the Courts
have no ground upon which to interfere, Section
12

227; and the powers which a municipal corporation
may exercise are intended to be used for the advantage of the public and the inhabitants generally
and not for the particular advantage of one individual or
group of individuals, Section 229; and generally a public
purpose has for its objective the promotion of the public
health, safety, morals, general welfare, security, prosperity
and contentment of all the inhabitants of the County, Section 230.
The County Commissioners (R 32) properly exercised
their discretionary power in denying the Petition and the
Lower Court (R 16) properly sustained such denial.
POINT

III

THE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS REGULARLY AND PUBLICLY HEARD THE PETITION
AND OPPOSITION THERETO AND DENIED THE PETITION IN THEIR DISCRETION AND THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION.
From 56 Am. Jur. 2d, an exercise of police power is
unreasonable where it permits control of the property of
one set of private owners by other owners of property,
Section 3 71; and it is well settled that the possession and
enjoyment of all private rights are subject to a reasonable
exercise of municipal police power and where the interest
of the individual conflicts with the interest of society, such
individual interest is subordinated to the general welfare,
Section 437, and it has frequently been noted that every
citizen holds its property subject to a reasonable exercise
of the police power of a municipality and that the use of
13

property shall not be injurious to the equal rights of others
to the use and benefit of their own property, and that the
public interest is paramount to property rights.

In the present case, the property rights of all oppo.
nents to the incorporation of the Town are paramount to
the proposition that the power plant at the Cottonwood
Mall must be sold to the Town, if incorporated. The personal rights and liberties of the opponents to the Town
cannot be arbritarily invaded under the guise of a Town
being incorporated so as to purchase the power plant at
the Cottonwood Mall.
Threatened condemnation was represented to the
County Commissioners and on file by Affidavit (R 47) by
an opponent to the proposed Town.
Some of the property owners, within the proposed
Town boundaries, struck their names from the petition
to incorporate, (R 37, 38, 39) and oppose any incorporation of the Town.

If Section 10-2-6 is an absolute mandate to the County
Commissioners to incorporate the Town of Cottonwood
City, then Section 10-2-6 violates the XIV Amendment
Section 1, U.S. Constitution and should be declared void.
The police power exercised by the County Commissioners extends to the reasonable protection of the oppo·
nents of the proposed Town, 56 Am. Jur. 2d Sec. 438, and
the County Commissioners have in the exercise of their
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police power a wide discretion in determining what precautions in the county interest are necessary and appropriate under the circumstances, and the Courts should not
interfere, Section 490; and it is well settled that the legislature may delegate to the County Commission for County
purposes, to be exercised within the County limits, three
essential branches of legislative power and that is police
power, power of taxation, and the power of eminent domain, Section 193.
The Petition by Petitioners propose "block busting"
the County.
Respondents have not authorized the arbitrarily
drawn boundary lines for the "Town" and Respondents
had no part in the proposal of the arbitrarily drawn
boundary lines, (R 32) and Respondents and intervenors
have not and do not sanction this detachment of property
from the County, and Respondents oppose this attempted
detachment of property from the County. This attempted
town detachment of property from the County is not in
the best public interest. This proposal to carve out and
detach property from the County, into a town, will greatly
injure the people and Salt Lake County.
Salt Lake County has not and is not committed to
furnish public services to the proposed Town of Cottonwood City, and the County cannot be compelled to undertake such, Section 560, 56 Am. Jur. 2d.
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CONCLUSION
That this Court affirm that the County Commission.
ers had discretion and properly denied the petition for a
Town incorporation, and affirm the Lower Court.
Respectfully submitted,

WALKER E. ANDERSON
Attorney for lntervenors
and Respondents.
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